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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ATION AGAINST THE STATE-The Jef-
ferson Lake Sulphur Company brought suit against the State of
Louisiana for the recovery of what it claimed to be its share of
the $1,427,826.51 which the state had recovered in a previous suit
against a salt mining company.' Louisiana Senate Bill 281 of
1944, authorizing the plaintiff to institute suit against the state,
was passed by both houses of the legislature but vetoed by the
governor. The court held that approval by the governor of legis-
lative action authorizing suit against the state is not necessary.
On the merits (which will not be considered in this note) the
court allowed recovery of plaintiff's claim of $897,465.72, reject-
ing a rather ingenious argument of the state that plaintiff's re-
covery should be limited to the amount of profit it would have
made had it actually mined the salt itself, an operation that
would have been quite expensive to undertake since the plain-
tiff was not equipped with any facilities to mine or market salt.
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So. (2d)
331 (1947).
Prior to the 1946 amendment, 2 Article III, Section 35, of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided "Whenever the Legis-
lature shall authorize suit to be filed against the State, it shall
provide a method of procedure and the effect of the judgments
which may be rendered therein." Since the present suit was
1. State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., Inc., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145
(1935). The defendant had mined salt from the bed of Lake Peigneur which
the court decided was the property of the state since the lake was found to
be navigable In 1812. The court found the trespass to be wilful and in bad
faith and assessed damages based on the market value p er ton of the salt
at the mouth of the mine during the period of trespass, without allowing
deduction for expenses incurred.
2. La. Act 385 of' 1946: "Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit
to be filed against the State it shall provide the method for citing the State
therein and shall designate the court or courts in which the suit or suits
authorized may be instituted and may waive any prescription which may
have accrued in favor of the State against the claim or claims on which
suit is so authorized. The procedure in such suits, except as regards citation
and original jurisdiction, shall be the same as in suits between private liti-
gants, but no judgment for money rendered against the State shall be satis-
fied except out of monies appropriated by the Legislature for the purpose.
For the purpose of such suits the State shall be considered as being domi-
ciled in the Capitol. No such suit shall be instituted in any court other than
a Court of Louisiana. Except as otherwise specially provided in this section,
the effect of any authorization by the Legislature for a suit against the State
shall be nothing more than a waiver of the State's immunity from suit in-
sofar as the suit so authorized is concerned."
[2891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
initiated prior to the amendment and since the amendment deals
only with procedure, for the purpose of this note further discus-
sion of it will be omitted.
The majority opinion was based almost entirely on the
"plain meaning" interpretation of Article III, Section 35, given in
Lewis v. State.8 In the Lewis case the court held that since the
article does not expressly provide either that permission must be
given by law or statute or that approval of the governor is neces-
sary, the legislature can authorize suit against the state by joint
resolution, without approval of the governor.
Justice Ponder's dissenting opinion pointed out that any
statement made in the Lewis case on this question must be con-
sidered dictum since not only was an interpretation of Article III,
Section 35, unnecessary for the decision of that case, but the
court specifically stated that the act became a law by limitation.
His opinion also pointed out that "There are many expressions
in our Constitution that 'the Legislature shall provide' where
it is contemplated that it shall provide by law but does not spe-
cifically say that it shall provide by law."'4
The majority opinion in both the present case and the Lewis
case were predicated on the theory that authority for the state's
immunity from suit is derived from the constitution. Particular
emphasis was placed on the specific wording of Article III, Section
35. There appears to be ample authority,5 however, for the posi-
tion taken by the dissent-that a state's right of immunity from
suit is a sovereign right and that the constitution merely fixes
the responsibility of the legislature for providing the "law of
procedure and the law governing the effect of the judgment."'
A thorough search of the jurisprudence in other states as
well as Louisiana fails to reveal any case in which the specific
issue was raised relative to the necessity of approval by the gov-
ernor. In each instance the act was submitted to the governor
for his signature and the act became law either by limitation or
by signature. In two Kentucky cases 7 the legislature waived its
immunity by a joint resolution, although the state constitution
3. 207 La. 194, 20 So. (2d) 917 (1945).
4. 34 So. (2d) 331, 343 (La. 1947).
5. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U. S. 527, 529, 15 L. Ed. 991, 992 (1858); State v.
Burke, 33 La. Ann. 969 (1881); Carter v. State, 49 La. Ann. 1488 (1897); Dur-
bridge v. State, 117 La. 841, 42 So. 337 (1906); Hood v. State, 120 La. 806, 45
So. 733 (1908); Doe ex dem, State Land Co. v. Factors & Traders Ins. Co.,
166 Ala. 63, 51 So. 991 (1909); Hamilton, Federalist No. 81.
6. 34 So. (2d) 331, 343 (La. 1947).
7. Commonwealth v. Haly, 106 Ky. 716, 51 S.W. 430 (1899); Commonwealth
v. Lyon, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1747, 72 S.W. 323 (1903).
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provided it was to be done by law. In each case the act was held
to be constitutional, but the court pointed out that the signature
of the governor was secured. It is interesting to note also that
in many of the Louisiana cases prior to the present one, the court
spoke of the statute or law, authorizing suit.8
However, whatever doubt existed on this question after the
Lewis case has now apparently been clarified. It is probable that
whatever nomenclature is given an act waiving the state's im-
munity from suit (statute, law,9 act, or joint resolution) approval
by the governor is unnecessary and his veto will be ineffectual. 10
The ruling in this case works a decided advantage for per-
sons seeking permission to sue the state. Not only is it often
improbable that a legislature will override the veto of a private
bill, but under the Louisiana legislative system many acts are
vetoed after the legislature has adjourned, which normally neces-
sitates a two-year waiting period before another bill can be
introduced.
The elimination of the possibility of a veto by the governor
whittles away some of the protection from suit a state enjoys.
Such protection has been severely criticized" as being outmoded,
unjust and inequitable in view of the vast and rapid expansion
of state activities in recent years, the delay in waiting for the
legislature to convene, et cetera.
Perhaps as a result of such criticism, there is a definite trend
among the states to abrogate the obsolete fiction that "The King
Can Do No Wrong." Three states, New York, Illinois and Mich-
igan, have followed the federal government in waiving its
immunity and have set up state courts of claims, meeting sev-
8. Durbridge v. State, 117 La. 841, 849, 42 So. 337, 339 (1906); D'Asaro v.
State, 204 La. 974, 978, 16 So. (2d) 538, 539 (1944); Crain v. State, 23 So. (2d)
336, 338, 339, 340 (La. App. 1945).
9. "Whether the authority is granted by special act or by resolution of
the Legislature it must be considered a law within the contemplation of
Article 7, Section 10 of the Constitution which gives this Court exclusive
jurisdiction when a law of this State has been declared unconstitutional."
(Italics supplied.) Fouchaux v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans,
35 So. (2d) 738, 739 (La. 1948).
10. A test case for this ruling may arise in the very near future. Some
of the bills passed by the 1948 Louisiana legislature were vetoed by the
governor, including La. Senate Bill 352, authorizing suit against the state,
and La. House Bills 488 -and 489, both authorizing suit against the Depart-
ment of Public Safety.
11. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1; (1926)
36 Yale L. J. 1; (1928) 28 Col. L. R. 577; Angell, Sovereign Immunity-The
Modern Trend (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 150; Maguire, State Liability for Tort
(1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 20.
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eral times each year. Fourteen states12 have authorized suits by
a general law, when the terms of the statute are fully complied
with and when the plaintiff is included in one of the classes set
out in the statute. In some states13 administrative tribunals hear
claims against the state.
The Jefferson Lake Sulphur case decision seems to be in
keeping with the modem trend of gradually stripping a state of
its immunity from suit.
WILLIAM E. SKYE
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO INSPECT BOOKS AND RECORDS UNDER
SECTION 38 OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT-Plaintiff, share-
holder in Union Construction Company, Incorporated, as well as
shareholder and director of Riverside Realty Company, Incor-
porated, sued to compel the latter company to allow him to in-
spect its books and records. Defendant resisted contending that
plaintiff was a stockholder in a competing business and owned
less than the twenty-five per cent of the stock of defendant cor-
poration required by the Business Corporations Act' before in-
spection can be compelled. Held, ". . . the objects and purposes
of the respondent corporation [Riverside Realty] and the Union
Construction Co., Inc. are of such scope that either. . . could en-
gage in several types of business. Hence ... parol evidence was
properly admitted to determine whether Union . . .and the re-
spondent '. are business competitors and . . . this evidence re-
veals that they are not."'2 Pittman v. Riverside Realty Company,
Incorporated, 36 So. (2d) 642 (La. 1948).
The requirement of ownership of a certain percentage of
stock as a prerequisite to the inspection of corporate books is a
recent innovation to corporation law.3 The general rule as de-
veloped at common law afforded a right of inspection limited only
by the requirement that such inspection be made at a reasonable
12. Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana (contract claims only), Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Virginia (pecuniary claims only), Washington, Wisconsin.
13. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Utah.
1. La. Act 250 of 1928, as last amended by La. Act 34 of 1935 (4 E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 1080 et seq.]. For a discussion of this act in Its
entirety, see Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928 (1940)
2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 644.
2. Pittman v. Riverside Realty Co., Inc., 36 So.(2d) 642, 644 (La. 1948).
3. Although our act is patterned after the Model Business Corporations
Act, this provision is entirely new. Of the three other states (Idaho, Wash-
ington and Kentucky) following the Model Act, none have a similar provis-
ion. Two states (New York and Illinois) require either a holding of stock
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